Force to use air power to "protect" them In my last report on the safe areas (5/1995/1389),  I referred to a number of constraints that limit the use of air power as a deterrent (and it is to be remembered that deterrence is the only means UNPROFOR is mandated to use against attacks on the safe areas). The most significant of those constraints, highlighted  in Bihac in November 1994, has been the introduction of air defence systems by the Bosnian Serb forces. As a result of this new threat, any use of air power at the present time must take into account the possible prior need, in advance of a contemplated air strike, to suppress air defence systems that threaten NATO aircraft. Such pre-emptive military action, while undeniably necessary to ensure the safety of the NATO aircraft, is inevitably considered by the Bosnian Serbs as a hostile act and can therefore take UNPROFOR beyond the limits of a peace-keeping operation and quickly make it a party to  the conflict.

41. In the final analysis, the only effective way to make the safe areas, as well as other areas of Bosnia and Herzegovina, truly safe, pending a comprehensive political solution achieved through negotiations, is to define a regime acceptable to both parties and to promote mutual respect for the arrangements to which, in the case of three of the safe areas, they have agreed. The use of force is an imperfect instrument to achieve that objective. In  this context I again invite the Council to give consideration to the recommendations in my reports of 9 May 1994(S/1994/555) and 1 December 1994 (S/1994/1389). In the latter report, I particularly emphasized the need to demilitarize the safe areas and thus establish a regime that would be in line with the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 and the Additional Protocols thereto of 1977, which have gained general acceptance in the international community.

H. Monitoring of the cease-fire within the Federation

42. Following the signature on 23 February 1994 of a cease-fire agreement between the Chiefs of Staff of the Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Croatian Defence Council, UNPROFOR, pursuant to Security Council resolution 908 (1994), assumed the following additional tasks:

(a) To monitor the cease-fire along the confrontation lines with patrols and observation posts;

(b) To establish heavy weapons collection sites;

(c) To monitor the heavy weapons that were not being handed over;

(d) To monitor the exclusion zone to prevent any return of heavy weapons;

(e) To transport and protect prisoners during exchanges;

(f) To assist in repairs to utilities. Except for minor incidents, this cease-fire has been widely respected and the presence and good offices of UNPROFOR on both sides of the cease-fire line have greatly contributed to stabilizing the situation within the Federation and to building confidence between the two communities.

I. Sarajevo

43. Among the safe areas, Sarajevo has received particular attention from the Security Council. Following the cease-fire that came into effect in the city on 8 February 1994, the Security Council, acting under Chapter VII, adopted resolution 900 (1994), which gave

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