• Some equipment shipped from the United States arrived later than the reserve units.
• The maintenance support and spare parts needed to repair and sustain equipment were in short supply.
• New support equipment on which units had to become proficient was issued in theater, such as the Global Positioning System that uses satellites to pinpoint the location of units with a portable ground receiver.

         Some Marine Corps units were able to correct their peacetime training deficiencies, and some were not, prior to combat:

• Active Marines still considered reserve units to be comparatively weak at effectively coordinating battalion - level operations.
• At least two of eight reserve artillery batteries improved so much that an active Marine artillery regimental commander judged them to be the best two units in his mixed active-reserve organization.
• One officer's after - action report on tank company combat said the company considered itself lucky that its training deficiencies did not lead it to serious battlefield harm.

Into Combat as Smaller Units

         During Operation Desert Storm, the Marine Corps' 4th Division did not fight at division or regimental / brigade level. Five combat battalions deployed, but most were used for rear area security, for handling POWs and for regimental reserve. Only one fought in combat as a battalion.

         The Marines detached companies from other battalions to engage in active combat. Twenty company - sized units ( including four tank companies and six artillery batteries ) fought in combat with effectiveness, initiative and courage.

Combat Support and Service Support: A Special Case

         The manner in which the Marine Corps employed its reserve combat support and service support structure was directly related to the scope of Operation Desert Storm requirements and forced the Marine Corps logistics units to operate well beyond peacetime doctrine, manning and equipment levels. For example:

• Pre - Operation Desert Shield, Marine Corps truck units expected one - way line hauls of 30 - 50 miles. In Southwest Asia, truck units confronted one-way line-haul requirements of 175-200 miles.
• Although Operation Desert Storm required that truck units operate 24 hours per day, peacetime manning, which had reduced the number of drivers per truck in active units from 2 to 1.5, meant that the active motor transport battalions had just 60 to 70 percent of their authorized drivers. This precluded around - the - clock operations in Southwest Asia.

         The extent of the inadequacy of the Marine Corps support structure became evident by early November. Then, the Marine Corps adopted a number of expedients that

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