• The Air Force activated almost 50,000 guard and reservists, about 25 percent of the available force. More than half was to support MAC by providing airlift, the rest to support TAC by providing fighter squadrons and SAC by providing air refueling. ( The Air Force activated less than 1,000 members of the Individual Ready Reserve ). These guard and reserve personnel also provided communications, intelligence, aeromedical evacuation and other support.
• Approximately 11,000 guard and reserve personnel ( about half guard, half reserve ) were in Southwest Asia at the peak of the war. They made up an estimated 20 percent of the Air Force in-theater strength. The three reserve component combat squadrons ( F - 16s, A - 16s, A - 10s ) that fought in the war made up about 5 percent of the Air Force in - theater strength.
• Many guard and reserve personnel remained in the United States to backfill units that had deployed overseas.

          At the beginning of the crisis, the Air Force relied heavily on volunteers. In August 1990, volunteers from the Air Force reserve components flew 42 percent of all strategic airlift missions and 33 percent of the aerial refueling missions.

          Immediately after receiving authority to call up 14,500 guard and reservists on August 23, 1990, the Air Force called to active duty three guard and three reserve squadrons to support MAC: five squadrons provided C - 5s and C - 141Bs for military airlift: one squadron provided airlift terminal and cargo managers. The Air Force eventually called all its reserve C - S crews and nearly all of its C - 141 crews.

          In subsequent call - ups, as its authority increased to 20,000 people on November 14, 1990, the Air Force continued to emphasize non - combat units until December 1990, when it mobilized three fighter squadrons in support of TAC.

          In selecting a unit to deploy, the commands relied on pre-war indicators of unit readiness ( as they had been planning to do ) and did not formally validate the readiness of the unit.

Tailored to Meet Requirements

          The Air Force tailored its use of the guard and reserve to meet the military requirements in Southwest Asia.

• A great deal of airlift and refueling was needed to move cargo and airplanes. The active force did not have the units to do the work.
• A few combat squadrons were needed when no more active squadrons were available. Had even more combat squadrons been needed, the majority would likely have come from the Air Force Guard and Reserve.

Reserve After Active

          TAC called up units from the reserve components only after it had deployed all the available active squadrons. The Air Force had decided early in the crisis to take no active units from the Pacific, no more than half of the active units from Europe, ad only two squadrons from each active wing in the United States.

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